William Stueck is Professor of History at the University of Georgia. Among his works is The Road to Confrontation:
American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950.
Review
"Stueck has canvassed research libraries in North America, England, and Australia to give us what must
stand as the most complete and intelligent international history of the war yet written."
-- Lloyd Gardner, Reviews in American History
"Any serious student of the Korean War will want to read this book for its measured perspectives and concern
to contextualize its subject."
-- Jeffrey Grey, Journal of Military History
"Stueck has written an impressive, largescale synthesis of the entire conflict.... He excels at describing
the intricate diplomatic maneuverings that took place throughout the war, and that were aimed at avoiding a major
clash between the great powers."
-- David Rees, The National Interest
"International history does not come much better than this. . . . William Stueck has scoured archives on four
continents to produce the most comprehensive, authoritative, and judicious singlevolume treatment of the politics
and diplomacy of the first major armed clash of the Cold War. . . . The book is a tour de force."
-- H.W. Brands, Pacific Historical Review
"A comprehensive and illuminating analysis and review of the Korean Warthe war that in many ways defined the
future of international relations, and in particular the American role in those relations."
-- The Honorable Paul H. Nitze, Former Arms Control Negotiator
From the Publisher's Web Site, Jan., 2003
Summary
This first truly international history of the Korean War argues that by its timing, its course, and its outcome
it functioned as a substitute for World War III. Stueck draws on recently available materials from seven countries,
plus the archives of the United Nations, presenting a detailed narrative of the diplomacy of the conflict and a
broad assessment of its critical role in the Cold War. He emphasizes the contribution of the United Nations, which
at several key points in the conflict provided an important institutional framework within which less powerful
nations were able to restrain the aggressive tendencies of the United States. In Stueck's view, contributors to
the U.N. cause in Korea provided support not out of any abstract commitment to a universal system of collective
security but because they saw an opportunity to influence U.S. policy. Chinese intervention in Korea in the fall
of 1950 brought with it the threat of world war, but at that time and in other instances prior to the armistice
in July 1953, America's NATO allies and Third World neutrals succeeded in curbing American adventurism. While conceding
the tragic and brutal nature of the war, Stueck suggests that it helped to prevent the occurrence of an even more
destructive conflict in Europe.
Table of Contents
LIST OF MAPS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 The Origins of the Korean War
CHAPTER 2 The Diplomacy of Confrontation and Consolidation
CHAPTER 3 Diplomacy Fails: The UN Counteroffensive and Chinese Intervention
CHAPTER 4 Limiting the War
CHAPTER 5 The Dimensions of Collective Action
CHAPTER 6 Armistice Talks: Origins and Initial Stages
CHAPTER 7 Progress
CHAPTER 8 Deadlock
CHAPTER 9 Concluding an Armistice
CHAPTER 10 The Korean War as International History
