CONCERNING THE INDWELLING OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE WITH THE GOOD, OR, ON THE RADICAL EVIL IN HUMAN NATURE
That "the world lieth in evil" is a plaint as old as history, old even as the older art, poetry; indeed,
as old as that oldest of all fictions, the religion of priest-craft. All agree that the world began in a good estate,
whether in a Golden Age, a life in Eden, or a yet more happy community with celestial beings. But they represent
that this happiness vanished like a dream and that a Fall into evil (moral evil, with which physical evil ever
went hand in hand) presently hurried mankind from bad to worse with accelerated
descent; so that now (this "now" is also as old as history) we live in the final age, with the Last Day
and the destruction of the world at hand. In some parts of India the Judge and Destroyer of the world, Rudra (sometimes
called Siwa or Siva), already is worshipped as the reigning God--Vishnu, the Sustainer of the world, having some
centuries ago grown weary and renounced the supreme authority which he inherited from Brahma, the Creator.
More modern, though far less prevalent, is the contrasted optimistic belief, which indeed has gained a following
solely among philosophers and, of late, especially among those interested in education--the belief that the world
steadily (though almost imperceptibly) forges in the other direction, to wit, from bad to better; at least that
the predisposition to such a movement is discoverable in human nature. If this belief, however, is meant to apply
to moral goodness and badness (not simply to the process of civilization), it has certainly not been deduced from
experience; the history of all times cries too loudly against it. The belief we may presume, is a well-intentioned
assumption of the moralists, from Seneca to Rousseau, designed to encourage the sedulous cultivation of that seed
of goodness which perhaps lies in us--if, indeed, we can count on any such natural basis of goodness in man. We
may note that since we take for granted that man is by nature sound of body (as at birth he usually is), no reason
appears why, by nature, his soul should not be deemed similarly healthy and free from evil. Is not nature herself,
then, inclined to lend her aid to developing in us this moral predisposition to goodness? In the words of Seneca:
Sanabilibus $#230;grotamus malis, nosque in rectum genitos nature, si sanari velimus, adiuvat.
But since it well may be that both sides have erred in their reading of experience, the question arises whether
a middle ground may not at least be possible, namely, that man as a species is neither good nor bad, or at all
events that he is as much the one as the other, partly good, partly bad. We call a man evil, however, not because
he performs actions that are evil (contrary to law) but because these actions are of such a nature that we may
infer from them the presence in him of evil maxims. In and through
experience we can observe actions contrary to law, and we can observe (at least in ourselves) that they are performed
in the consciousness that they are unlawful; but a man's maxims, sometimes' even his own, are not thus observable;
consequently the judgment that the agent is an evil man cannot be made with certainty if grounded on experience.
In order, then, to call a man evil, it would have to be possible a priori to infer from several evil acts done
with consciousness of their evil, or from one such act, an underlying evil maxim; and further, from this maxim
to infer the presence in the agent of an underlying common ground, itself a maxim, of all particular morally-evil
maxims.
Lest difficulty at once be encountered in the expression nature, which, if it meant (as it usually does) the opposite
of freedom as a basis of action, would flatly contradict the predicates morally good or evil, let it be noted that
by "nature of man" we here intend only the subjective ground of the exercise (under objective moral laws)
of man's freedom in general; this ground-- whatever is its character--is the necessary antecedent of every act
apparent to the senses. But this subjective ground, again, must itself always be an expression of freedom (for
otherwise the use or abuse of man's power of choice in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor
could the good or bad in him be called moral). Hence the source of evil cannot lie in an object determining the
will through inclination, nor yet in a natural impulse; it can lie only in a rule made by the will for the use
of its freedom, that is, in a maxim. But now it must not be considered permissible to inquire into the subjective
ground in man of the adoption of this maxim rather than of its opposite. If this ground itself were not ultimately
a maxim, but a mere natural impulse, it would be possible to trace the use of our freedom wholly to determination
by natural causes; this, however, is contradictory to the very notion of freedom. When we say, then, Man is by
nature good, or, Man is by nature evil, this means only that there is in him an ultimate ground (inscrutable to
us) of the adoption of good maxims or of evil maxims (i.e., those contrary to law), and this he has, being a man;
and hence he thereby expresses the character of his species.
Review
"Of the many attempts to interpret Christianity solely in ethical terms, Kant's effort seems to me to be
the most profound and illuminating. His Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone illuminates primarily
the great philosopher's understanding of man's moral life, but also casts light, indirectly and directly, on some
of the fundamental beliefs of Christian religion. The book is indispensable to students of ethics, important for
theologians, and significant for all who are concerned about the human condition."
--H. Richard Niebuhr
"One of the most interesting and most human of Kant's works. Although Kant speaks in the language of the Eighteenth
Century, he is wrestling with problems which force themselves on us today--unless we dismiss all religion as pathological
or swallow it blindly at the behest of some external authority."
--H.J. Paton
"One does not have to agree with Kant's conclusions--and I do not--in order to acknowledge this as a great
work in the history of philosophical theology. It is the product of Kant's mature years, an effort to connect his
religious thought with the rest of his epoch-making philosophy as presented in his three Critiques."
--Morton White
Harper Collins Publishing Web Site, November, 2000
Summary
'Of the many attempts to interpret Christianity solely in ethical terms, Kant's effort seems to me to be the
most profound and illuminating. His Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone illuminates primarily the great
philosopher's understanding of man's moral life, but also casts light, indirectly and directly, on some of the
fundamental beliefs of Christian religion. The book is indispensable to students of ethics, important for theologians,
and significant for all who are concerned about the human condition.'
